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/lp/american-economic-association/overconfidence-and-diversification-Zl0IAHvdd7
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- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2014 by the American Economic Association
- Subject
- Articles
- ISSN
- 1945-7685
- eISSN
- 1945-7685
- DOI
- 10.1257/mic.6.1.134
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract Experimental evidence suggests that people tend to be overconfident in the sense that they overestimate the accuracy of their private information. In this paper, we show that risk-averse principals might prefer overconfident agents in various strategic interactions because these agents help diversify the aggregate risk. This may help understanding why successful analysts and entrepreneurs tend to be overconfident. In addition, a different interpretation of the model presents a novel evolutionary foundation for overconfidence, and explains various stylized facts about this bias. (JEL D81, D82 )
Journal
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics – American Economic Association
Published: Feb 1, 2014