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- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2014 by the American Economic Association
- Subject
- Articles
- ISSN
- 1945-7685
- eISSN
- 1945-7685
- DOI
- 10.1257/mic.6.1.205
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract We study optimal income taxation and public-goods provision under the assumption that the cross-section distributions of productive abilities or public-goods preferences are not known a priori. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with similar interests. The analysis therefore incorporates a requirement of coalition-proofness. The main result is that increased public-goods provision is associated with a more distortionary and a more redistributive tax system. With a conventional Mirrleesian treatment, the level of public-goods provision is not related to how distortionary or redistributive the tax system is. (JEL D82, H21, H23, H41 )
Journal
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics – American Economic Association
Published: Feb 1, 2014