Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Optimal Collateralized Contracts†

Optimal Collateralized Contracts† AbstractWe examine the role of collateral in a dynamic model of optimal credit contracts in which a borrower values both housing and nonhousing consumption. The borrower’s private information about his income is the only friction. An optimal contract is collateralized when in some state, some portion of the borrower’s net worth is forfeited to the lender. We show that optimal contracts are always collateralized. The total value of forfeited assets is decreasing in income, highlighting the role of collateral as a deterrent to manipulation. Some assets—those that generate consumable services—will necessarily be collateralized, while others may not be. Endogenous default arises when the borrower’s initial wealth is low, as with subprime borrowers, and/or his future earnings are highly variable. (JEL D82, D86, G21, G51) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

Optimal Collateralized Contracts†

Optimal Collateralized Contracts†

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , Volume 12 (4) – Nov 1, 2020

Abstract

AbstractWe examine the role of collateral in a dynamic model of optimal credit contracts in which a borrower values both housing and nonhousing consumption. The borrower’s private information about his income is the only friction. An optimal contract is collateralized when in some state, some portion of the borrower’s net worth is forfeited to the lender. We show that optimal contracts are always collateralized. The total value of forfeited assets is decreasing in income, highlighting the role of collateral as a deterrent to manipulation. Some assets—those that generate consumable services—will necessarily be collateralized, while others may not be. Endogenous default arises when the borrower’s initial wealth is low, as with subprime borrowers, and/or his future earnings are highly variable. (JEL D82, D86, G21, G51)

Loading next page...
 
/lp/american-economic-association/optimal-collateralized-contracts-QPqejXjeq0
Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.20170179
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractWe examine the role of collateral in a dynamic model of optimal credit contracts in which a borrower values both housing and nonhousing consumption. The borrower’s private information about his income is the only friction. An optimal contract is collateralized when in some state, some portion of the borrower’s net worth is forfeited to the lender. We show that optimal contracts are always collateralized. The total value of forfeited assets is decreasing in income, highlighting the role of collateral as a deterrent to manipulation. Some assets—those that generate consumable services—will necessarily be collateralized, while others may not be. Endogenous default arises when the borrower’s initial wealth is low, as with subprime borrowers, and/or his future earnings are highly variable. (JEL D82, D86, G21, G51)

Journal

American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Nov 1, 2020

There are no references for this article.