Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Matching with Moral Hazard: Assigning Attorneys to Poor Defendants†

Matching with Moral Hazard: Assigning Attorneys to Poor Defendants† AbstractWe model the problem of assigning counsel to poor defendants as a matching problem. A novel aspect of this matching problem is the moral hazard component on the part of counsel. Within the model, we show that holding the total expenditure for counsel fixed and changing the matching procedure to accommodate defendants’ and attorneys’ preferences, i.e., switch from random matching to stable matching, defendants become worse off because a stable matching exacerbates the moral hazard problem on the part of counsel. In addition, we show that under suitable conditions random matching is the efficient way to allocate defendants to counsel. (JEL D82, D86, K41) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

Matching with Moral Hazard: Assigning Attorneys to Poor Defendants†

Loading next page...
 
/lp/american-economic-association/matching-with-moral-hazard-assigning-attorneys-to-poor-defendants-ELXcVngKee
Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.20150283
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractWe model the problem of assigning counsel to poor defendants as a matching problem. A novel aspect of this matching problem is the moral hazard component on the part of counsel. Within the model, we show that holding the total expenditure for counsel fixed and changing the matching procedure to accommodate defendants’ and attorneys’ preferences, i.e., switch from random matching to stable matching, defendants become worse off because a stable matching exacerbates the moral hazard problem on the part of counsel. In addition, we show that under suitable conditions random matching is the efficient way to allocate defendants to counsel. (JEL D82, D86, K41)

Journal

American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Aug 1, 2018

There are no references for this article.