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AbstractI incorporate a monitoring-based firm hierarchy into an industry equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. I then use the theory to study aggregate impacts of an economy-wide improvement in monitoring efficiency. This shock generates a selection effect, which favors more hierarchical (i.e., more layers) firms. Interestingly, these implications depend on firms' heterogeneous choices about their hierarchy and completely disappear when firms are homogeneous in terms of the number of layers inside the hierarchy. (JEL D21, L23, L25, M12, M54)
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics – American Economic Association
Published: Nov 1, 2017
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