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Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment†

Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment† AbstractWe study the effect of how types are assigned to participants in a signaling-game experiment. The sender has two actions, In and Out, and two types. In one treatment, types are i.i.d. in every period, and senders gather experience with both types. In the other, types are assigned once-and-for-all, and feedback is type specific. The theory of learning in games predicts that the non-Nash but self-confirming equilibrium where some fraction of types play Out can persist in the fixed-type treatment but not when types are i.i.d. Our results confirm that more senders do play Out in the fixed-type treatment. (JEL C92, D82, D83) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment†

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.20180317
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractWe study the effect of how types are assigned to participants in a signaling-game experiment. The sender has two actions, In and Out, and two types. In one treatment, types are i.i.d. in every period, and senders gather experience with both types. In the other, types are assigned once-and-for-all, and feedback is type specific. The theory of learning in games predicts that the non-Nash but self-confirming equilibrium where some fraction of types play Out can persist in the fixed-type treatment but not when types are i.i.d. Our results confirm that more senders do play Out in the fixed-type treatment. (JEL C92, D82, D83)

Journal

American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Nov 1, 2019

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