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Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure†

Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure† AbstractThis paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insufficiently skeptical about nondisclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback. (JEL C70, D82, D83) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure†

Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure†

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , Volume 13 (2) – May 1, 2021

Abstract

AbstractThis paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insufficiently skeptical about nondisclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback. (JEL C70, D82, D83)

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2021 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.20180217
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractThis paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insufficiently skeptical about nondisclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback. (JEL C70, D82, D83)

Journal

American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: May 1, 2021

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