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International Credit Flows and Pecuniary Externalities †

International Credit Flows and Pecuniary Externalities † Abstract This paper develops a dynamic two-country neoclassical stochastic growth model with incomplete markets. Short-term credit flows can be excessive and reverse suddenly. The equilibrium outcome is constrained inefficient due to pecuniary externalities. First, an undercapitalized country borrows too much since each firm does not internalize that an increase in production capacity undermines their output price, worsening their terms of trade. From an ex ante perspective each firm undermines the natural “terms of trade hedge.” Second, sudden stops and fire sales lead to sharp price drops of illiquid capital. Capital controls or domestic macro-prudential measures that limit short-term borrowing can improve welfare. (JEL F32, F43, G15, O41 ) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics American Economic Association

International Credit Flows and Pecuniary Externalities †

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by the American Economic Association
Subject
Articles
ISSN
1945-7715
eISSN
1945-7715
DOI
10.1257/mac.20140054
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract This paper develops a dynamic two-country neoclassical stochastic growth model with incomplete markets. Short-term credit flows can be excessive and reverse suddenly. The equilibrium outcome is constrained inefficient due to pecuniary externalities. First, an undercapitalized country borrows too much since each firm does not internalize that an increase in production capacity undermines their output price, worsening their terms of trade. From an ex ante perspective each firm undermines the natural “terms of trade hedge.” Second, sudden stops and fire sales lead to sharp price drops of illiquid capital. Capital controls or domestic macro-prudential measures that limit short-term borrowing can improve welfare. (JEL F32, F43, G15, O41 )

Journal

American Economic Journal: MacroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Jan 1, 2015

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