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Information Design†

Information Design† AbstractA designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal. (JEL C72, D78, D82, D83) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.20170351
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractA designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal. (JEL C72, D78, D82, D83)

Journal

American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Nov 1, 2019

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