Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility, and the Selection of Candidates †

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2016, 8(2): 61­85 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130036 By Marina Agranov* We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but infer the candidates' ideologies from observing candidates' campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates' types depends on the visibility of the race. This model captures two patterns: the post-primary moderation effect, in which candidates pander to the party base during the primary and shift to the center in the general election; and the divisive-primary effect, which refers to the detrimental effect of hard-fought primaries on a party's generalelection prospects. (JEL D11, D72, D83) olitical primaries, an influential institution in the American political process, require candidates to obtain a party nomination by vote in order to compete in the general election. Two established facts about primaries are that candidates tend to pander to the party base during primaries and moderate their platforms after securing the nomination;1 and more prominent and, thus, hard-fought primaries can influence a party's chances of winning the election.2 The first observation, "post-primary moderation," follows from the premise that primary voters hold more extreme political views than the general-election voters. The second observation, the so-called "divisive-primary" hypothesis, suggests that a candidate's prospects in a general election may be affected by the visibility of the primary race. * California Institute of Technology, 1200 E. California Boulevard, Pasadena, CA 91125 (e-mail: magranov@ hss.caltech.edu). I would like to thank Andrew Schotter and Alessandro Lizzeri for the invaluable help and encouragement they have provided during the course of this project. I thank Alex Agranov for...