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Financial Risk Capacity†

Financial Risk Capacity† AbstractFinancial crises are particularly severe and lengthy when banks fail to recapitalize after bearing large losses. We present a model that explains the slow recovery of bank capital and economic activity. Banks provide intermediation in markets with information asymmetries. Large equity losses force banks to tighten intermediation, which exacerbates adverse selection. Adverse selection lowers bank profit margins, which slows both the internal growth of equity and equity injections. This mechanism generates financial crises characterized by persistent low growth. The lack of equity injections during crises is a coordination failure that is solved when the decision to recapitalize banks is centralized. (JEL D82, E32, E44, G01, G21, G32, L25) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics American Economic Association

Financial Risk Capacity†

Financial Risk Capacity†

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics , Volume 13 (4) – Oct 1, 2021

Abstract

AbstractFinancial crises are particularly severe and lengthy when banks fail to recapitalize after bearing large losses. We present a model that explains the slow recovery of bank capital and economic activity. Banks provide intermediation in markets with information asymmetries. Large equity losses force banks to tighten intermediation, which exacerbates adverse selection. Adverse selection lowers bank profit margins, which slows both the internal growth of equity and equity injections. This mechanism generates financial crises characterized by persistent low growth. The lack of equity injections during crises is a coordination failure that is solved when the decision to recapitalize banks is centralized. (JEL D82, E32, E44, G01, G21, G32, L25)

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2021 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7715
DOI
10.1257/mac.20160286
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractFinancial crises are particularly severe and lengthy when banks fail to recapitalize after bearing large losses. We present a model that explains the slow recovery of bank capital and economic activity. Banks provide intermediation in markets with information asymmetries. Large equity losses force banks to tighten intermediation, which exacerbates adverse selection. Adverse selection lowers bank profit margins, which slows both the internal growth of equity and equity injections. This mechanism generates financial crises characterized by persistent low growth. The lack of equity injections during crises is a coordination failure that is solved when the decision to recapitalize banks is centralized. (JEL D82, E32, E44, G01, G21, G32, L25)

Journal

American Economic Journal: MacroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Oct 1, 2021

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