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False Positives and Transparency†

False Positives and Transparency† AbstractI develop a theoretical model of costly information acquisition in order to evaluate transparency requirements in empirical research. A sender chooses an experiment characterized by multiple dimensions, while a receiver observes the experiment’s outcome (though not necessarily all dimensions). I show that the receiver may prefer to keep dimensions hidden, even those contributing to bias, despite preferring more informative experiments. This can occur if the perception of bias is lessened when the sender compensates along a dimension that is observed. I elucidate how complementarity between dimensions underlies this result. (JEL D82, D83) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

False Positives and Transparency†

False Positives and Transparency†

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , Volume 14 (2) – May 1, 2022

Abstract

AbstractI develop a theoretical model of costly information acquisition in order to evaluate transparency requirements in empirical research. A sender chooses an experiment characterized by multiple dimensions, while a receiver observes the experiment’s outcome (though not necessarily all dimensions). I show that the receiver may prefer to keep dimensions hidden, even those contributing to bias, despite preferring more informative experiments. This can occur if the perception of bias is lessened when the sender compensates along a dimension that is observed. I elucidate how complementarity between dimensions underlies this result. (JEL D82, D83)

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2022 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.20190218
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractI develop a theoretical model of costly information acquisition in order to evaluate transparency requirements in empirical research. A sender chooses an experiment characterized by multiple dimensions, while a receiver observes the experiment’s outcome (though not necessarily all dimensions). I show that the receiver may prefer to keep dimensions hidden, even those contributing to bias, despite preferring more informative experiments. This can occur if the perception of bias is lessened when the sender compensates along a dimension that is observed. I elucidate how complementarity between dimensions underlies this result. (JEL D82, D83)

Journal

American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: May 1, 2022

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