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- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2011 by the American Economic Association
- Subject
- Articles
- ISSN
- 1945-7685
- eISSN
- 1945-7685
- DOI
- 10.1257/mic.3.2.194
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract We extend Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton's ( 1987 ) classic model to analyze the equilibrium incidence and impact of exclusive contracts in a setting where research and development ( R&D ) drives industry performance. An exclusive contract between an incumbent supplier and a buyer arises when patent protection and/or the incumbent's R&D ability are sufficiently pronounced. The exclusive contract generally reduces the entrant's R&D, and can reduce the incumbent's R&D. Exclusive contracts reduce welfare if the incumbent's R&D ability is sufficiently limited, but can increase welfare if patent protection and the incumbent's R&D ability are sufficiently pronounced. ( JEL D86, L14, O31)
Journal
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics – American Economic Association
Published: May 1, 2011