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Abstract We show that efficient exchange obtains independently of the degree to which a legal system protects the rights of owners. We study a number of different legal rules, including property rules (strong protection), liability rules (any party can take the owner's asset but must pay a legally determined compensation), and even rules that protect the owner's interests very weakly (liability rules with a very low compensation level). Efficiency is obtained as long as the degree of protection provided by law and by the bargaining protocol is not “too” inversely correlated with a party's valuation of the asset. (JEL D21, D51, K11, 034, P14 )
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics – American Economic Association
Published: Nov 1, 2016
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