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Electoral Accountability and Interdistrict Competition†

Electoral Accountability and Interdistrict Competition† AbstractThis paper analyzes a multidistrict game of electoral accountability in which constituencies compete over scarce resources by setting expectations for targeted spending. I build a political agency model in which a vote-maximizing politician is subject to the oversight of distinct constituencies. The voters’ demand for targeted spending in these constituencies is driven down by the competition among them. In order to make their constituency an attractive choice for discretionary spending, the voters adopt reelection standards below what they receive in equilibrium. They therefore tend to be satisfied with the distributive politics of the incumbent politician. The incumbent is then quite likely to win more than half of the votes. (JEL D72, D82) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

Electoral Accountability and Interdistrict Competition†

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.20150307
Publisher site
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Abstract

AbstractThis paper analyzes a multidistrict game of electoral accountability in which constituencies compete over scarce resources by setting expectations for targeted spending. I build a political agency model in which a vote-maximizing politician is subject to the oversight of distinct constituencies. The voters’ demand for targeted spending in these constituencies is driven down by the competition among them. In order to make their constituency an attractive choice for discretionary spending, the voters adopt reelection standards below what they receive in equilibrium. They therefore tend to be satisfied with the distributive politics of the incumbent politician. The incumbent is then quite likely to win more than half of the votes. (JEL D72, D82)

Journal

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics – American Economic Association

Published: Aug 1, 2018

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