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Designing Dynamic Research Contests†

Designing Dynamic Research Contests† AbstractThis paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best. (JEL D82, O32) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

Designing Dynamic Research Contests†

Designing Dynamic Research Contests†

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , Volume 12 (4) – Nov 1, 2020

Abstract

AbstractThis paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best. (JEL D82, O32)

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.20180263
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractThis paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best. (JEL D82, O32)

Journal

American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Nov 1, 2020

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