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Community Structure and Market Outcomes: A Repeated Games-in-Networks Approach

Community Structure and Market Outcomes: A Repeated Games-in-Networks Approach Abstract Consider a large market with asymmetric information, in which sellers have the option to “cheat” their buyers, and buyers decide whether to repurchase from different sellers. We model active trade relationships as links in a buyer-seller network and study repeated games in such networks. Endowing sellers with incomplete knowledge of the network, we derive conditions that determine whether a network is consistent with cooperation between every buyer and seller that are connected. Three network features reduce the minimal discount factor sufficient for cooperation: moderate and balanced competition, sparseness, and segregation. Incentive constraints are binding and rule out efficient networks. (JEL C73, D82, D85, Z13 ) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

Community Structure and Market Outcomes: A Repeated Games-in-Networks Approach

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by the American Economic Association
Subject
Articles
ISSN
1945-7685
eISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.4.1.32
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract Consider a large market with asymmetric information, in which sellers have the option to “cheat” their buyers, and buyers decide whether to repurchase from different sellers. We model active trade relationships as links in a buyer-seller network and study repeated games in such networks. Endowing sellers with incomplete knowledge of the network, we derive conditions that determine whether a network is consistent with cooperation between every buyer and seller that are connected. Three network features reduce the minimal discount factor sufficient for cooperation: moderate and balanced competition, sparseness, and segregation. Incentive constraints are binding and rule out efficient networks. (JEL C73, D82, D85, Z13 )

Journal

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics – American Economic Association

Published: Feb 1, 2012

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