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- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2017 © American Economic Association
- ISSN
- 1945-7685
- DOI
- 10.1257/mic.20150236
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
AbstractWe study path-independent choice rules applied to a matching context. We use a classic representation of these choice rules to introduce a powerful technique for matching theory. Using this technique, we provide a deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and study its properties. Next, we obtain a compelling comparative static result: if one agent's choice expands, the remaining agents on her side of the market are made worse off, while agents on the other side of the market are made better off. Finally, we establish several results related to path-independent choice rules. (JEL C78, D11, D71, D86)
Journal
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics – American Economic Association
Published: Aug 1, 2017