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An Economic Theory of the Evolutionary Emergence of Property Rights †

An Economic Theory of the Evolutionary Emergence of Property Rights † Abstract We model the emergence of an innate, biological sense of property rights where resource scarcity and output contestability reign. Preferences evolve such that, in evolutionarily stable equilibrium, an object is valued more by an individual who possesses it, or has produced it, than if he is neither possessor nor producer. In a distributional contest for the object, the possessor/producer will devote more effort to retaining it than an interloper will to expropriating it. Asymmetry in preferences for an object between possessor/producer and interloper, and consequent asymmetry of efforts defending or expropriating it, constitute our concept of innate property rights. (JEL C73, D11, P14 ) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

An Economic Theory of the Evolutionary Emergence of Property Rights †

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by the American Economic Association
Subject
Articles
ISSN
1945-7685
eISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.6.3.203
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract We model the emergence of an innate, biological sense of property rights where resource scarcity and output contestability reign. Preferences evolve such that, in evolutionarily stable equilibrium, an object is valued more by an individual who possesses it, or has produced it, than if he is neither possessor nor producer. In a distributional contest for the object, the possessor/producer will devote more effort to retaining it than an interloper will to expropriating it. Asymmetry in preferences for an object between possessor/producer and interloper, and consequent asymmetry of efforts defending or expropriating it, constitute our concept of innate property rights. (JEL C73, D11, P14 )

Journal

American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Aug 1, 2014

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