Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
The analysis presented in this paper contributes to research on the consequences of electoral systems on corruption, the electoral impunity of corrupt governments and politicians, the impacts of competitiveness on liability and corruption, and the adverse economic effects of political corruption. The paper generates insights about the circumstances under which individuals hold elected politicians responsible for corruption, the impact of corruption information on electors’ positions and conduct, the pivotal workings in guaranteeing accountability and moderating corruption, and the link between party system consequences and corruption. The findings of this study have implications for the manner citizens assess politicians impeached for corruption, the association between corruption and party system competitiveness, and the electoral effects of corruption. JEL codes: D72; D73 Keywords: electoral system; corrupt politician; party system competitiveness; elector
Economics, Management, and Financial Markets – Addleton Academic Publishers
Published: Jan 1, 2015
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.