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We study the problem of allocating multiple resources to agents with heterogeneous demands. Technological advances such as cloud computing and data centers provide a new impetus for investigating this problem under the assumption that agents demand the resources in fixed proportions, known in...
We define smooth games of incomplete information. We prove an extension theorem for such games:price of anarchy bounds for pure Nash equilibria for all induced full-information games extendautomatically, without quantitative degradation, to all mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibria withrespect to...
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret, we are able to adapt statistical machine learning...
We consider the problem of designing revenue-maximizing online posted-price mechanisms when the seller has limited supply. A seller has k identical items for sale and is facing n potential buyers (agents) that are arriving sequentially. Each agent is interested in buying one item. Each agents...
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