11 - 15 of 15 articles
AbstractWe examine a setup where two agents allocate a fixed budget between public goods in two areas. The agents may be biased to one area, which is their private information. Without communication, the funds are allocated inefficiently, resulting in gaps and duplication in public good...
AbstractWe experimentally examine private information and communication in a public goods environment with uncertain returns. We consider a common-value public goods game in which the return to contribution is either high or low. Before contributing, three players observe private signals...
AbstractUtilitarianism plays a central role in economics, but there is a gap between theory, where utilitarianism is dominant, and applications, where monetary criteria are often used. For applications, a key difficulty is to define how utilities should be measured and compared. Drawing on...
AbstractThis paper proposes a novel way of distinguishing whether a person is naïve or sophisticated about her own dynamic inconsistency using only her task-completion behavior. It shows that adding an unused extra opportunity to complete a task can lead a naïve (but not a sophisticated) person...
AbstractWe propose the exponential satisficing model of boundedly rational decision-making, a general-purpose tool designed for use in typical microeconomic applications. The model posits that the preferences perceived and acted upon by the agent are a stochastic coarsening of his or her true,...
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Sign Up Log In
To subscribe to email alerts, please log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
To get new article updates from a journal on your personalized homepage, please log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.